

The Role of Revolution in Foreign Policy Behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Ontological Security Approach

Davoud Gharayagh-Zandi

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Economic and Political Science, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran-Iran

Received: 25.04.2025 / Accepted: 06.07.2025 / Published: 10.07.2025

*Corresponding Author: Davoud Gharayagh-Zandi

DOI: [10.5281/zenodo.15857166](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15857166)

Abstract

Review Article

Understanding Iran's foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 seemed not to be gained; unless it connected concepts of revolution and foreign policy. It realized the potential benefit of the idea of revolution in analysing, explaining, and predicting Iran's foreign behaviour, rather than Islamism or nationalism. The concept not only has to show what went through a policy process, but it also has to do with the basic ideas that shaped the revolutionaries' mind-set. They are the revolutionary practices that securitized the domestic situation to control the negative effects abroad. The main matter is how to preserve the revolutionary ideals, as well as to ensure survival under threat. It is called ontological security which can provide a meaningful picture of why the Iranian foreign policy is fraught with difficulties to make sense of on purpose. Without the image depicted, it cannot portray why it shows the ebb and flow in the process. In addition, the paper tries to demonstrate that there is no effective solution to socialize the revolutionary political system, and it is out of the question to give a hard and fast rule for the revolutionaries.

Keywords: Islamic Republic of Iran, Foreign Policy Behaviour, Revolution, Ontological Security, Ideationalism.

Citation: Gharayagh-Zandi, D. (2025). The role of revolution in foreign policy behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An ontological security approach. *GAS Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences (GASJAHSS)*, 3(4), [187-198].

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy is of essence business to preserve a nation in interacting with the rest, mainly because it is characterized by high stakes, enormous uncertainties, and substantial risk (Renshon and Renshon, 2008: 509). As usual, foreign policy points out that a unitary actor endeavors to maximize its gains and improve its national interests in the anarchic international system; that is, what the realistic and rationalistic approach takes for granted. In doing so, it tries to designate the type, level of analysis, process and dynamics, and decision-making models; identifying the foreign policy determinants such as what comes from the environment, the psychological factors, and the international and the domestic issues (Mintz and Derouen, 2010: 3). As for, what makes sense the differences between them, highly may be related to those taken in above. Furthermore, the Unit's foreign policy makes a difference in conducting the alternative ones such as bounded rationality, cybernetic model, bureaucratic politics, organizational implications, prospect theory, and heuristic theory (Mintz and Derouen, 2010: 69). As of yet, what is known

as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) could be just described, analyzed, and even evaluated (Neack, 2014: 18). Let's assume that we may find out the ones which are the far cry from, what should be carried out to look for. The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is on the scholars' case. Let's to conduct a review in brief.

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, many works have been published on the foreign policy of the IRI. The scholars find it goes smoothly to figure out or to explain in detail. Looking through the literature, a lot has been tried to explain various binding concepts. All concepts come up with Idealism/Realism as the quintessential concept (Gharayagh-Zandi, 2008) by which they endeavored to explore or employ some contradicting notions, such as the revolutionary ideals/national interests (Perteghella, 2017: 62), the radical/the pragmatic attitudes (Adib-Moghadam, 2018: 10); the radical/the moderate (Przeecz, 2013: 65) or the conservative-dominated/the pragmatist and the reformist fractions inside of the IRI political system (Rankel, 2007: 166); the theoretical/the practical (Naghizadeh, 2009: 50), ideological/the practical ideas

(Sariolghalam, 2009: 22) or the principles/the practical approaches (Axworthy, 2014: 2); the Islamic Ideals/the Westphalia imperative (Zaree, Zaynivand and Rezaali, 2014: 119); the rational pale/the irrational fanaticism (Ansari, 2007: 243). These works descriptively try to clarify the basic principles and perceptive cognitive parameters that determine Iranian foreign policy. They demonstrated why the foreign policy of the IRI set out a misperceived projection in international relationships; what the reason for contradicting the independence attitude with the interdependence one; how some issue conducted seems to have a marked lack of rationality, consistency, and opportunity; why some dimensions of Iranian foreign objectives portrayed as aggressive not defensive; or to reach a rapprochement between the US and Iran not being rightly expectation.

In addition, some sources tried to explain the behaviour of IRI abroad instead of criticizing. The texts describe how Iran conducted its foreign policy rather than all contradictions; to what extent it changed its ideals on behalf of its survival; in what manner and in what situation and also in what region it treated by its ideational issues, rather than to the practical and why. It tries to understand, for example, why Iran under the Rouhani administration refused to get back to the negotiating table with US President Trump to re-articulate its Middle Eastern foreign policy or its missile facilities at the expense of downgrading the JCPOA international agreement. Two sets of explanations are important here; the first demonstrates that conventional interest-based pragmatism had gradually dominated foreign policy in various past times that may seem different. Axworthy (2014: 7-8) best stated that "from the beginning, however, there was also a pragmatic stand in Iranian foreign policy; sometimes in conflict with the revolutionary principles and sometimes eclipsed by it". He addressed many examples on Iranian foreign policy behaviour that demonstrated to be prevailed the pragmatist behaviour at the action policy, although at the declaratory one the Islamic ideals was yet in the propagating manner; of the underlying one could be mentioned, would be including the resignation of Mahdi Bazargan, the first prime minister of revolutionary regime after the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran; rejecting Montazeri's opportunity to being successor of the second supreme leader in the Iran-Contra time and reaching the weapons from the Israeli's at the expense of Iran's effort to release the US hostages in Lebanon; going of Assad secular and Arab regime based on the Baathist originated as a national ally in the MENA region; keeping the Khomeini's religious sentence on the Rushdie affair quiet due to his death; appealed to popular nationalism to encourage the troops to continue the war against Iraq alongside the Islamic motif; held support the Christian-dominated Republic of Armenia in its dispute with the Shia majority Azerbaijan Republic over Nagorno-Karabakh region in 1994; promoted the national rights in acquiring the nuclear program by assimilating with and reference to the US-Britain joint coup of 1953 against the Mohammad Mosaddeq, the legitimated prime minister of that time (Shoori, 2011). Therefore, to reach a convergence between Iran and the West, it concluded, that it seems possible, just should be to build ahead on common interests in various issues. The key point of what is appraised is that Iran is held accountable

as a sovereign state in the international system. The question is if being the pragmatist is perforce, why appeal to ebb and flow to the revolutionary ideals as the Ahmadinejad administration did, and additionally did go back pragmatically in reverse at the Rouhani administration recurrently. Thomas Juneau correctly, as in its book's meaningful title "Squandered Opportunity" employed, pointed out that a state should rationally seek to maximize its power and by logical extension its status in the world, Iran allegedly distorted its state's true interests by the feelings of being victimhood. (Juneau, 2015) As a result, it is inadequate to address a satisfactory explanation of Iran's foreign behaviour despite its deliberate efforts.

The second explanation insists that it is out of the question to make sense of the foreign policy of the IRI by the current main IR theories; otherwise, should a shifting focus on the Islamic state as the chief core due to its nature and identifiable perception, meanly that "the preservation and the continuation of Islamic identity have a preference and high priority at the foreign policy-making process of IRI" (Dehghani Firozabadi, 2009: 42; 2011: 8; also see to Mohammadi, 1998). An invaluable book on the relationship between culture and foreign policy shows that "religious identity should not be assumed to be the primary cultural influence affecting a regime identity or behaviour. In cases examined in this study, no correlation was found between common religious affinity and perception of threat, the tendency to ally, and strategic cooperation or lines of conflict. This was especially true of the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the [Caucases] region" (Shaffer, 2007: 5-6).

So far, the literature has tried to indicate what should be done in the case of IRI and why this foreign behaviour would be made a contradiction in the result (Reisinezhad, 2023: 296) and seems irrational according to the realistic approach. Why did Iran take the bull by the horns? It does not seem like a lost cause. Behaviourism comes to give a hand by introducing three significant changes in the concept of foreign policy; first, it tries to address the states and governments as concrete individual entities, rather than the realistic abstracted picture of them; second, it challenges the "objective" perspective of realism by prospecting the "subjective" outlook; and the last one, it points out the impact of internal and social factors on the decision-making process alongside – not focused on – the external sources of foreign policy (Taylor, 1994: 120).

The paper is going to take up the behaviourism on the foreign policy of IRI; it is of help to explain and to predict how the IRI has been conducting its foreign behaviour, and so the main question is which factor as the main one could be more effective in explaining, perceiving, and predicting the foreign policy of IRI? It is going to hypothesize that the revolutionary motif constructed the foreign orientation of IRI and is the highest guide for action, like the constitution of an organization. To examine the hypothesis, the paper is going to be organized into five sections; a theoretical relation between the revolution and foreign policy comes after the introduction; then the underlying revolutionary motif of IRI means "the Revolutionary Practices" needs to address the sequential sections; the fourth section allocated to the ontological version of foreign policy process of IRI comes before the conclusion.

Revolutionary Practices Lead to the Ontological Security

"A rapid, fundamental and violent" as Samuel Huntington preciously defined revolution, "domestic change in the dominate values and myths of a society, in its political institutions and social structure, leadership and government activity and politics". (1996: 5) So it is a domestic cause of political change and as usual, it must studied by political sociologists. When a new regime comes to power, its new foreign policy in comparison with the ancient one becomes a focus of interest.

Therefore, it seems that there is an indirect relationship between the revolution and foreign policy and the latter comes up after. Although the thought-provoking works of Fred Halliday, are close to them. In doing so, he tried to explain the relationship between revolution and IR in which four areas that can be studied: "cause, that is, how far international factor produces revolutions; foreign policy, that is, how revolutionary states conduct their foreign policy; response, that is, the reaction of other states; formation, that is, over a longer time-span, international factor, the system as a whole, constrains the post-revolutionary internal development of states and shapes their political, social and economic evolution". (Halliday, 1999: 350)

It is important to know how far international factors play a role in the cause of revolution alongside domestic ones and why it has affected countries. As a common, not the main, cause, political sociologists such as Hannah Ardent tried to introduce revolution and war as contradicting processes of modernity in the international system. (Ardent, 1990) That is why Halliday argues that the two contradictions of modernity play a formative role in the modern history of international relations. (Halliday, 1999: 15) So, it could be referred to as a cause of the shaping of terrorism too.

By the four areas, Halliday introduced very profound issues between revolution and FP such as; if international factors are involved with the occurring revolution, the foreign policy of the revolutionary regimes would be perforce reacted to it; the revisionist foreign policy of revolutionary states would be threatening the other states by which it made a vertical security matter, the consequence of horizontal security that caused revolution; by all means of ideological foreign policy with security matter, it leads to the revolutionaries to restore to war to face with the counter-revolutionary forces from abroad; thereby the introducing the sociological perspective of state vs. the legal-political one, it's pursuing solidarity with the relevance societies instead of sovereignty and respect to non-involving, namely export of revolution, made a huge constrain on the revolutionary regimes conforming with the international norms. The interesting relationships between the revolutionaries and the rest, made a brilliant explanation in detail by him.

By the way, he is tried to make a relationship between revolution and IR by comparison with the examining the six

revolutions including the Iranian revolution, this paper tends to explain a refreshingly different examination on such as: firstly, it is the relationship between the Iranian revolution with its foreign policy, not solely with the IR; secondly, here it is the revolution as the independent – not dependent - variable considered to find out how it can make very different of the FP; thirdly, it is tend to study of the "process" of the revolutionary FP alongside of what has a likely "outcome"; fourthly, in the academic theories of revolution, Halliday's work is placed in the comparative politics that pursued to find out the "abstract" issues (Zuckerman, 2008: xvii) instead of the particular ones; though it is tries to make a focus on the latter in order to show some important particularities of revolution and its impact on that foreign policy appeared in far cry of the conventional one; lastly, the particulars of revolutions draw a construction of the FP that is about the identity-oriented, not about the body-politics. "The concept of ontological security allows us to see rational agency instead of an effect of practices". (Mitzen, 2006: 345) In addition, "Ontological security reveals how the crisis that garners the attention of states challenges their identity. As the disparate behaviours of states illustrate, identity needs to compel them to pursue seemingly irrational actions – yet such behaviour must have made sense to the state agents who decide upon that course of action at that time". (Steele 2008: 3). Actually, it explains the revolutionary states take calculations about the means-ends relationships that govern their behaviour on foreign policy; it means that the revolutionary states feel in the confident milieu by which if it disappears, it causes anxiety or a sham for them. It is a conflict-based examination of the revolutionaries' foreign policy thereto.

Let's to show that it would be termed 'revolutionary practices' as may be implied as revolutionary paralyzes. First and foremost, it must be known that revolutions look like a river coming to begin; by no means is it possible to be under control. Thereby it has to be accompanied with it instead of damming because it stirs strong passions, which is inevitably expected to happen by it. While the revolution river was coming to flow, the turnouts felt compelled and caused huge damage to those who intended to come to rationalize it. That is why war and revolution are by coincidence.

Second, as it were, one thinks that what the revolutionaries are doing is the nature of new political behaviour in contrast with the past. It gets at the formidable opponent by paying high costs such as war may appear in advance. The revolutionaries are well-known that the main issue reached the new situation was to bring about it by making a bipolarity between society and the old regime in their favor; because the critics who rejected their resignation from the ancient regime and their correlated foreign supporters did not stay silent and are going to change the situation at the reverse back. So, counter-revolution is not an illusion, it's a reality, but there is no return to the past. The new regime must be provoked to utilize the situation at the expense of their significant opponents as the new adversaries, that means, by the previously experienced strategy, such as getting on a social bipolar bandwagon. In the current situation, it takes

office in every way possible. Therefore, the FP would kept in control by the revolutionaries.

Third, revolutions at their first endeavors to establish a new regime, need to be readily accepted by all to provide a chance to apply their grace conceptions to the new situation; what seems to be an illusion is that grace situation must be possible to address by the revolutionaries because they think that while the revolution occurred as soon as expected, it is not impossible to transcendence the heaven into the earth, regardless of the nature of destruction is a far cry from the construction. To bring the situation to peace, they are growing impatient even with whom were their staunch allies during the pre-revolution period accusing them of betrayal. It is known as the "period of Grace," calm before the ineluctable storm that the revolutionaries produce. (Halliday, 1999: 136) It is an illusion because it converts into the "law of suspects" in which all would take part in an alleged conspiracy; it "declares that Terror was the order of the day." (Jennings, 2011: 5)

Fourth, waging war by the revolutionaries is simultaneously the defensive and offensive mixed plot. It is defensive because they are naturally threatened by the adversaries explained above. The same is offensive by the widespread revolutionary excitement that defuses the tension that it termed as "war psychosis" (Brinton, 1965: 100) let's permission to procrastinate the all topsy-turvy; it means that by promoting asymmetrical warfare, it tried to show that it is all or nothing in the domestic and the abroad. It is opportunistic because it utilizes every means for the end. "The idea of a political system guided in its international conduct by a specific code of ideological and operational principles is often difficult for Westerns to understand." (Miller 1990: 1-2; Fatemi Nejad, 2024: 290)

Five, the revolutions are ideology-driven, though there is an indeterminacy to find out whether it is a pragmatic endeavor to survive because the best way to defend is to attack or it is an expansionist policy because it prevents care to deter the enemy from attacking; in addition, "every successful expansion creates new positions to the defense," so any "either-or-ism" would be too misleading. (Ibid: 2)

Six, consequently, the revolutionary states make a deep resonance with dictatorship by the high contradiction between order and liberty as the result. "Is not," Robespierre asked, "the death of the founders of the liberty itself a triumph? Only the 'tomb' would bring them 'rest', I do not believe in the necessity of life ... only a terrible truth and death". (Jennings, 2011: 18). The resort to terror is inevitably the fate of not a revolution but all of them. Because the two branches made into the revolutionaries, one of them believes that there is only no time enough to be awaited to prevail the liberty to bring the society along the grace situation but also taking the liberty to do, made a situation out of control and reached the society to the unreasonable political disorder. The other one argues that it does not bring about the grace situation unless institutionalizing the revolutionary ideals for which it would be inspiring as a model of a political system to follow by the minimum costs and

would be deeply accepted voluntarily. By the experience of the Moderates that got rid of the power, the latter stayed in power for the foreseeable future. The net result is that liberty falls into the dictatorship. Therefore, the revolutions, using being the crisis-born at the outset, must keep on it while holding in place.

Seven, the new regime tries to achieve three important aims: survival, stratified position, and last it is possible to reach the leadership position. For doing so, the revolutionary leadership's strategies in FP are bargaining and controlling avoidance, legitimizing the regime and its foreign politics, insulting the FP from domestic political pressure, pursuing new allies abroad to preserve its situation, de-legitimizing the current world order to reach a stratified prestige for itself and at last striving to achieve a leadership position at the international level for revising the situation on behaved itself. It is an escape-ahead strategy to reach them all out of the blue. If it is impossible all of a sudden, the leadership's strategy in FP would be isolationism to portray itself as a unique working system for others.

Lastly, there is an apparent contradiction between somehow the revolutionaries, after the revolution wined, perceived itself as a state responsible for the world order which is state-centered, or a revolutionary movement that wined at its first phase and needs to continue in advance to reach full goals of the revolution. It is named 'the perpetual revolution' and appeared for the first time in the Russian Revolution to establish a society of economic equality. (Brinton 1965: 229) The social process of revolution is a complementary stage of the revolution. Without it, the first phase of the revolution would be highly absurd because the revolution itself is just a historical moment and is temporary. To be sustainable, this process is important to deepen the revolutionary ideals. Not only is it a strategy to export revolution constantly at the expense of the opponents, but also does it a plot to justify its politics notwithstanding political dysfunction in managing the domestic situation and what constraints come from its particular internationalism. The revolution leaders referred to the first deficit as dependent on the latter as usual.

All eight primary revolution practices affect the domestic policy-making process and the foreign one, and it is impossible to conceive how the revolutionary states' foreign policy is made. The particulars of revolutions draw a construction of the FP that is identity-oriented, not about body politics. "The concept of ontological security allows us to see rational agency instead of an effect of practices." (Mitzen, 2006: 345) In addition, "Ontological Security reveals how the crisis that garners the attention of states challenges their identity. As the disparate behaviours of states illustrate, identity needs to compel them to pursue seemingly irrational actions – yet such behaviour must have made sense to the state agents who decide upon that course of action at that time". (Steele 2008: 3). Actually, it explains the revolutionary states that take calculations about the means-ends relationships that govern their behaviour on foreign policy; it means that the revolutionary states feel in the confident milieu by which, if disappeared, it causes anxiety or a sham for them. It is a

conflict-based examination of the revolutionaries' foreign policy. Let's set to work on the Iranian revolutionary foreign policy.

The Role of Revolution in Foreign Policy Behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979

Here, it tries to review Iran's foreign policy from the day after the 1979 revolution by utilizing the revolutionary practices, as mentioned above. It needs to portray some essential principles of Iran's revolutionary foreign policy first to understand what comes alone.

As a long-lasting civilization, the Iranians are in the unending talking with the past. It is because of two reasons: their ancient glorious empire memory that had stretched from the Indian peninsula in eastern Asia to North Africa on the west side of existing borders, and the second one is related to their unfavorable and imparity situation entangled with the contemporary facing with the European countries. It may be reasonable that recapturing that position would be difficult for a long foreseeable time. But it did remind them of the continuum primordial identity that remained in their record history rather than all the ups and downs witnessed. It made the expectation that they would be engaged with the world affairs not as the center of the universe as were in the long past but being of in the all good manner related.

On the other side historically some civilizations and countries caused the current situation that led to the loss of previous territories that belonged to Iran's empire in the past: the Macedonian empire vastly invaded Iran by Alexander the Great from 312 BC to 63 BC, the Arab attacked the Sassanid dynasty in the 642 BC, the third one returned to Nineteen-century wars between Russia and Iran by which Iran lost the many fertile territories in the western and eastern north borders and the last one occurred in 1885 the Britain did strive to separate Herat province in the East side of Iran's border. All made unfavorable memories among Iranians up till now.

Besides the foreign issues that caused the decline of the Persian Empire, it could be found the domestic. The tribal dynasties did come into office one by one from the outset of the Empire to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. These tribal dominations set the political scene of Iran as a continuous struggle for power among them. In this vein, the established tribesmen did the very things needed to survive their position against opposition resulting in the arbitrary and despotic manners in the political culture of Iran. The very endeavors done in the constitutional revolution of 1906 did not enable changing the despotic face of the Qajar and Pahlavi monarchies because both took power in absolute manners at last.

The claim stated by the leaders of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was that they had the intent to remove the two historic critical dams that stopped the Iranian's peace, progress, and prosperity- despotism and colonialism. It manifested itself through the political snappy slogan of that time that remained "Independence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic of Iran".

They all try to encapsulate here the basic ideas and perceptions of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In reality, it is divided into three parts: Autarkic Independence, Freedom, and Islamic Government. It may be adding the fourth element of the political culture of the Islamic Republic that is deemed the revolutionary change or transformation, rather than the evolutionary one. By these four critical elements, the Islamic Republic reappeared in Iran has demonstrated itself since 1979. That is why minor changes in the essence of these elements from abroad made a metamorphic rock.

It would be precious to describe some of the most important items of Iran's foreign policy guidelines. In theory, the main conception of Iran's foreign policy is addressed in articles 152 to 154 of the Constitution as follows:

Article 153: Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of national life, is forbidden.

Article 154: The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and the rule of justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the Mustad'afun (the oppressed) against the Mustakbirun (the oppressors) in every corner of the globe.

As in the introduction mentioned and in the Constitutive manifested; Iran's foreign policy would be designed in the four levels: preserving the territorial integrity and independence; denying all colonial domination in foreign relations supporting the Muslims throughout the world by priority at first on the Shia and then Sunnis; and the last one is a universal ideal to bring all through the globe into happiness by the Islamic outlet.

Iran has a pessimistic, revisionist, and simple view of the world. It is pessimistic by rejecting any cooperation with the powerful states in the world because of its opposition to the world-dominated structure which did not any placement of the other countries. It is a revisionist that stated the slogan "No West, No East, just the Islamic Republic" so that it tried to establish a new bloc of powers consisting of Islamic countries in resistance to the Western-dominated world. It is a simple-minded perspective of the world's power dynamics regardless of its power structure for transforming the world and an effort to make a world full of justice, peace, and prosperity for all. There is a perception about the Iranian Authorities' mindset, that a chosen group must be doing their critical mission.

Now let's to get back to the revolutionary practices. The first period of the foreign policy of the revolutionary state was conducted by the interim government, which was established by Mahdi Bazargan on Feb. 3, 1979, to provide the situation for the new political system, reforming the political institutions according to the revolutionary ideals, making a new constitution, and set a referendum that approved on March 31, 1979, to build up the legal mechanism of parliament election up to Nov. 4, 1979. During the nearly 12-month trial, the interim government's foreign policy endorsed the non-alignment or

positive neutrality based on the known slogan 'No West, No East.' It means that it preserved itself from that day's bipolar system rivalry, trying to be independent sovereignty away from the two power blocs, endeavoring to develop the relationship with all nations (except Israel) without challenging the ongoing international system. (Sadri 2002: 444) In doing so, the government did take action to withdraw from the CENTO treaty on March 25, declaring to decline the relation with Egypt in the Camp David Treaty made by that country with Israel sequence on Apr. 30, became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on June 9, rejecting the capitulation right brought out for the Americans to be kept away from any persecution on Nov. 30, rejecting the treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Right (US-Iran) of 1959 on Nov. 2 and the same the articles of 5 and 6 of Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship of 1921 on Nov. 30, 1979. (Valipour 2004: 81-83)

The Bazargan's foreign policy had reached crisis point with the revolutionaries from the various dimensions: in dichotomy of priority between Islam and Iran in abroad, he gave priority to Iran in the age of Westphalia in alongside of precious to Islam as the religion; furthermore, the export of revolution would be of the turnout of the revolution by providing inspiration for others instead of involving the domestic affairs; as a result, he deemed to pledge general support the liberation movement throughout the world at the political level without violating the sovereignty principle; the big two points of ultimate ends of the revolution in the Bazargan's mindset were anti-despotism and anti-Imperialism, by extension the latter was to consolidate the independent position of the country, not beyond; there is no reason to pursue the defensive pattern of Pahlavi Dynasty by the non-alignment strategy so that he declined the strategic and advanced military equipment ordered by the old regime and substituted them to use for the agriculture; last but not least one, he believed to follow suit Mossadeq experience in 1952 coup that it needs to keep sound distance from the superpowers rivalries, not near to being dependent and not far to being threatened, so the interim government was tried to have a good relationship with the US and Soviet union at the same.

The revolutionaries opposed the Moderates, especially regarding their relationship with the US because they believed that the US had acted on behalf of the Pahlavi Dynasty as a client since the 1953 coup and now provided shelter for the Shah after escaping from the country. These all indicated the dishonesty behaviour of the US to revive its position again in Iran, the Moderates were going to bring about it through their relations with the US embassy in Tehran and also had a visit with the Carter national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski on Oct. 19, 1979; it provided a pretext of accusing them as the compromisers and led to occupied the embassy in Tehran on Nov. 3, 1979. The moderates found themselves in a difficult situation to admit it or not; by reaching a very pride of it as a new phase of revolution which is bigger than previously happened in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini, new period of Iran's foreign policy started in which the Moderates resigned, and the Extremists had taken office; it hatched a result revolutionary plot again by which provoking a social bi-polarity and severity at the same, it possible to remove the opposites and take control over through escalating the relation with the US. It is conclusive

proof of the inevitability of revolutions look-alike a river so that it led the revolution's leader into a *fait accompli* position. It has been a complicated issue between the US and Iran till now. (Mossalanejad, 2023: 1)

By clearance of the Moderates, the *devoevlastie* system (in Russian) or dual powers or sovereignty was removed, and the unified revolutionary state took power. We witnessed a new and purely revolutionary foreign policy by utilizing the threats of counter-revolution, which tried to turn the clock back that started after the occupation of the US embassy in collaboration with adherents of the old regimes. The revolutionaries thought holding the hostages would guarantee to prevent the US attack on Iran to swap the situation, and diverge the US attention on the hostage issue into the US political dimension. It received a setback by the US endeavors to attack to release the hostage. However, by suffering a defeat at Tabs desert on Apr. 23, 1979, it jumped at a chance for the Iranians and caused a major scandal involving the US government. It was solved by getting back to indirect negotiation between the two countries by Algeria.

Consequently, all prepared to prevail on a grace society promised to be done while the revolution triumphed, not only in the domestic environment but also throughout the MENA region, and when it faced delays, it turned out impatient among the revolutionaries to be done. It needed proof that their new revolutionary foreign policy was deferred to the Moderates. Also, it became clear to them that by defusing the grace situation in other countries, it would feel a secure future and pick up speed to prevail. In doing so, instead of the non-alignment that is willing to be away of - not challenging - the two superpowers system, it seemed that not only does it reject the perception that the balance of power would be reaching a world peace, but also does it just an unfair principle to justify the colonial and great powers in the world; further, it is maintaining of the bi-polar system at the expense of third world countries, so it tried to deconstruct the ongoing world order to be reaching a just alternative order instead of. (Mohammadi 1998: 48)

The new Ideology-driven foreign policy based on the export of revolution and revisionist attitude made amid concern over and provoking the new counter-revolution in the region tried to build up strength by waging the war that was welcomed by the great powers to keep under control of the Iranian revolutionary ideals. Up to the end of the war, the new strategy strived to export the revolution to the countries which therein the Shiite majority in Bahrain and Iraq, Lebanon, and Azerbaijan; it was to provoke the Shiite minority of Saudi Arabia to occupy the Sacred Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and bloody suppressing the Iranian pilgrims who protested against Saudi Arabia at Mecca in 1987, it also made deep concern in the Soviet authority of falling Iran's revolutionary influence in its Soviets in which there are Islamic orientations, and that was the main reason of attacking Afghanistan in 1979. As a result, the great powers, all countries at its periphery came against Iran. Meanwhile, getting entangled in war, diverged revolutionary Iran's perception from the export of revolution to the struggle for survival. In the Persian Gulf, it led to the establishment of the (Persian) Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) on the six south coasts of the Persian Gulf to face Iran's threat, which came in stark contradiction to Iran's other revolutionary ideal to highlight Israel's threat bearing down on. Both superpowers of that time were engaged more than before the revolution's twin pillar strategy in the region, which contrary to Iran's primary end was away, they tried to set a better context to export the revolution.

The last of the Iraq-Iran War; conceived that it was not supposed to have a victorious end for any part, and both countries that engaged in the war found their fighting putting more distance with a means to an end. Therefore, the end of the war led to highly controversial political debates on the way in the wind during the first decade of the revolution in Iran. On the one hand, those who were at war insisted on continuing the war and rejecting rationalism because it would mean that a self-absorbed, pragmatist, and underplayed revolutionary ideals may be more concerned about the regime. On the other hand, at the strategic level, continuing the war would inflict more harm on the revolutionary ideals, and it indicates that it needs to revise the way gone to find a new measure to pursue the ideals in advance; to be recorded in history is inadequate, making the history forward is of paramount to the regime. It is not the end of revolutionary ideals to catch a breath of fresh air in the future. Through his charismatic position, Ayatollah Khomeini had the last cast of his solo and high performance to end the war; nonetheless, it is undeniable that Ayatollah Khomeini was a pioneer who constantly changed the revolutionary priority (Ramazani 2001: 69). It means that it was not the end of the matter. The contradiction of Islam/Iran's principal source of behaviour or solidarity/sovereignty principle priority will keep the main debate.

The two facts changed the conventional period of revolutionary Iran: the first one was the end of the war and accepting the UNSC 598 resolution on the termination mechanism of war by Iran. It returned to the favor of the reconstruction process and turned back to the Moderates' foreign policy. Ayatollah Khamenei, in the time of presidency, declared that an "open door policy entails a rational, reasonable and good relationship with all nations to carry on the national, Islamic and Iranian interesting; so while Iran faced a deficit, it needed to find help from the foreign resources; it is impossible for a hundred prolonged" (Pourakondi Darzi 2002: 50). The second novel fact was the collapse of the Soviet Union in the northward of Iran's border. It not only terminated the Cold War order in international relationships but also prepared the context to rephrase its foreign policy from internationalism to regionalism in the post-cold world. As an Iranian scholar stated, the objective figure of the new era of Iran's foreign policy is to divert attention from the Ideology to geopolitics: "By the ending the bipolarity international system, it appeared a different and novel security environment in comparison with the past, to some extent, it marked a shift in Iran's foreign policy from Idealism and Isolationism to pragmatism and alliance" (HajiYosofi 2005: 6).

Therefore, Hashemi's foreign policy, known as routinized for the economic path, comprised of declaring the coexistence, cooperative and trust-building measurement relationship with

the world; revolving the stability mechanism in the Persian Gulf; building up a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia as the balancer power in the GCC; turning a paradigm shift from cementing the relationship with the state instead of linking up with the liberation movements; tried to rebalance at its periphery regional arrangements at the expense of new world order led by the US; rearticulated economically with the world to absorb the foreign investment; participating actively into the international and regional organizations including the UN, the Islamic Cooperation Organization (ICC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union created a buffer zone on its northern border. Iran found a chance to play a positive and mediator position in the regional conflicts of newly established republics of the former Soviet Union; it had a beneficial effect on releasing the American hostages in Lebanon and made a neutral decision about the Iraq attack on Kuwait in 1991 in advance (Roshandel 2002: 12; Tajik 2004: 193; Millani 2004: 192).

Meanwhile, of all positive developments, Iran has faced considerable problems in foreign policy, such as the resignation of the Turkish Islamic-oriented prime minister Erdogan by the Turkish Secular-oriented army as a preventive measure immediately after coming back home from Iran, breaking off the Iran-EU relationship in the aftermath of Mikonos court sentence against Iran, emerging Taliban in Afghanistan and souring relation between Iran and Pakistan, made a conflicting claim of UAE on the three Iranian Islands in the Persian Gulf, doing the favor of Christian Armenia in conflicting with a Shiite majority Azerbaijan to prevent the Pan Turkish sentiments that are threatening the Iranian sovereignty, giving up the crises between Russia and Chechnya by feeling apathy because it needs to the Russian supporting at the period of post-cold world leverage made by US. The issues caused a considerable problem in Iran's policy-making process meant the contradiction between the sovereignty and solidarity principles. What was conducted during the Hashemi Administration is unclear about which one was made a priority as President Hashemi declared that "It may be in some issues, in my perception, to deserve our principals, in the some of them lose it and the reminders give up them" (Azqandi 2002: 10). As a result, it is both either-or-ism at the same.

The next revolutionary main issue that affected Iran's foreign policy and led to the known Reformist administration in 1997 was the dichotomy between order and liberty. Up to that time, the war with Iraq and its imperative to do a reconstruction deal caused a delay in the revolutionary promise to bring a grace society based on liberty into the ground. Now it is time to resolve the contradiction issues that came ground by freedom in the past due to the main ideals of revolutionaries, including the truth vs. expediency, freedom vs. justice, Islam vs. the West, religious law (Al-Sharia) vs. common law, maximal state vs. minimal state, theologian vs. intelligentsia, and democracy vs. theocracy (Gharayagh-Zandi, 2006: 187-193).

The 1997 presidential election, by which Sayed Mohammad Khatami came to office, was to convey a sense of open door policy through being more engaged in international relations in the obvious reluctance of the Conservatives. Iran's new foreign

policy put in detention and the civilization dialogue instead of the known American Political scientist Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations'. Accordingly, it held a detention towards the MENA, especially the Persian Gulf countries, and set a target for the world through the dialogue of civilizations. It received a dramatic improvement in Iran's foreign policy due to the Thermidorian convention by the world and the region, the extent to which the dialogue of civilizations was high on the UN agenda at that time.

Two events throw a shadow of doubt on the progressive development in Iran's foreign policy since the end of the war: the imposing of the Clinton administration's economic sanctions on Iran and disclosing the Iranian covert nuclear program, thereby escalating the situation. In the aftermath of the 9/11 event by which both the east and westward Iran's border faced the US attack in 2001 and 2003, Iran and the EU took some measures, such as Sa'ad Abad Submit and the Paris Agreement in 2004, to de-escalate the regional situation and solving the bilateral issues including the Mikonos and Salman Rushdie issues and Iran breathe a sigh of relief of the US economic leverage instead (Dehghani Firouzabadi 2005: 65).

It was open to debate on what Khatami tried to address the global dialogue of civilizations, is a complementary phrase of the No West and No East formation of the Iranian Revolution in virtue of the post-Soviet era in Iran's foreign policy to utilize a universal common sense instead of the clash of civilizations heard from the US to represent the demon spirit of the West or is a new Troy horse of the West to get a handle in the Sovietization measurement, the process preceded as the Perestroika and Glasnost deal by the last Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev whereby led to the collapse of the system unprecedentedly? (Nowrozi 2004: 222) It not only opened the two powers' sovereignty addressed in the Moderates era, it was, but it also raised doubts about the Reformist intentions as new counter-revolution forces on the inside because it used non-revolutionary terminology such as 'dialogue' instead of 'justice'. Rather fairly, the Reformists believed that the dialogue would better introduce the divinely Islamic facet of Iran's revolution to extend the influence throughout the world by the given conception. It explains a predicament in which the Reformists still tried to refuse the accusation of subversion which shows that Iran's situation is a far cry from the last years the Soviets faced. The Conservatives deemed that Gorbachev's intention inadvertently led to catastrophe because he tried to have a new, improved formula, alas, the control lost.

According to the seventh revolutionary practice addressed above, the revolutionaries, through the Reformist Administration, perceived that if they stayed home, they would be apologists for revolutionary behaviour so that it called a new unknown day in the future; thereby, to escape the great powers' clutches, they tried to get back to follow the revolutionary ideals, especially the main one in the foreign policy was to export of revolution in the region, the issue faced with a coral reef of the world at the outset of the revolution. The Ahmadinejad administration took power in 2005 based upon the revisionist attitude towards the world order, the aggressive orientation towards the West, revising Iran's regional policy

based on extending the relationship with the nations and liberation movements instead of the state, having endeavored to oust the US unilateralism at the international level, to publicize counter-post-modern imperialism throughout globally and lastly promoting the 'looking the East,' means who had no good favor of the West, especially the US, such as China and Russia. (Mansori Moghaddam and Esmaili, 2011: 284)

The aftermath of the world financial crisis of 2007-2008 resulted in a huge increase in global oil prices which frustrated Iran's ambition for the nuclear program and ballistic missile technology, and alongside the Arab Spring that fused folk political demonstrations throughout the MENA, provided the situation to play along for Iran in the region to stand up its proxies in the critical points of. The FP reached considerable reactions from the region and beyond, such as four UNSC resolutions unprecedented in the Iraq-Iran war. Because it construed a different perception by distinction through the hard core of the system that it was a sign of Iran's growing regional power at the expense of the foes, as a result, they tried to put pressure on Iran to push back home. On the other side, there was gripe by fear about Iran's nuclear program alongside its delivery facilities and ever-growing regional position in the region and beyond. Therefore, an international campaign was constituted to change the foreign behaviour of Iran with the huge smart sanction that reached the point at last the 2013 presidential election turned in favor of the opposite fraction. The result of the trial period of revolutionary foreign policy is according to what Karl Marx once correctly put on the historical facts: "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgets to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce". (Marx 1972: 10)

President Rouhani also tried rapprochement with the world based on having "constructive interactions" with the international community in foreign policy. In doing so, first of all, it needs to solve the problems made before him for operating this policy concerning the world, especially with the Western countries. While all sanctions imposed on Iran for changing its behaviour are related to its nuclear program, it was reasonable to take the first step to reach a practical manner to relieve the international pressure that came under the huge sanctions. It ratified as signing the JCPOA with the 5+1 countries in 2013 based on rephrasing and rearticulating the Paris Agreement signed in 2004 in the Khatami Presidency and also President Rouhani was that time as Staff of the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) and the senior negotiator at the nuclear issue. Not only does it set a proper situation with its relations with Russia and China under international – not just bilateral – commitment, but it also sets a context for relationships with the Western countries, especially with the EU. For the first time, it overtly initiated a direct negotiation with the US – Iran on their problems from the overturned Pahlavi Dynasty in 1979. Strictly speaking, joining the US as a negotiator – not as a supervisor that was in the Khatami presidency – did facilitate that the US should not only commit to it as an international agreement; but also, does it provide any pretext for the US leveraging the EU in relation with Iran (Gharayagh-Zandi 2005: 15).

According to the JCPOA, Iran and the other side especially need to be connecting on the nuclear program and its related issues, such as Ballistic Missile delivery, most of all in the foreseeable future. It was an unwritten procedure of the gentlemen's agreement despite being declared as a nuclear-related agreement. The plan named the JCPOA2 (BARJAM2) is about Iran's delivery system and the regional architecture. It was rejected outright by IRGC and declared publicly by the Supreme Leader because they thought it was a non-stop process to bear rapprochement between the US and Iran. As a result, it meant that Iran was getting hold of being a revolutionary state by compensation. Consequently, the US decided to withdraw from the JCPOA (Salmani Nejad, 2020: 72), and all are going to get worse above all Iran's economic issue under huge sanctions and maximized pressure from abroad which made some endeavors as the test balloon to subversion such as demonstration on the increased price of oil in Jan. 2019 that failed. (Khalili, 2023: 194)

Let's to raise some points here; firstly, the economy in comparison with the military is getting high priority as Trotsky perceived in the 1920s, "A Ford tractor is just as a Creusot gun, with the sole difference that which the gun can function only from time to time, the tractor brings its pressure to bear upon us constantly" (Halliday 1999: 261). Secondly, What the US maximum pressure during the Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and Raeisi administrations unfolded is that the self-reliance and self-contained fortress is a metaphor and publishing the resilience economy document by the Supreme Leader is not a workable and neat solution for huge costs burdening on the society notwithstanding it is indicated of being the weakened revolutionary state such as the Raeisi' administration in providing the grace society. It was an important issue in Pezeshkian's electoral triumph in July 2024. Thirdly, a strategy of the revolutionaries, by referring to the perpetual revolution, intends to commit to the promise to the foreseeable future that would be so near to realized instead of all the enemies did against the revolution failing. In doing so, the Supreme leader published renewed documents on the parsimony of revolution at the second forty steps to realize all promised as the grace society (Khamenei 2018). Lastly, what would be learned from the Chinese revolution is that they felt in the 1970s that "an over-engaged foreign policy could hamper China's economic needs by either restricting the country from key trading partners or by prioritizing military spending over economic investment" (Sofer 2012: 2). If it is so, why Iran didn't get back to negotiating table in the Raeisi administration on behave of its economic revolving at the expense of the regional situation? Let's examine it by referring to ontological security and it will show that it is not easily reached in the Pezeshkian administration as seen in the US and Israel attack on Iran in 2025.

Ontological Security as the missed point of the Revolutionary FP

As stated, ontological security is identity-related, which tries to explain why some states sometimes treat it as irrational; that is, there is a lack of end-means relationship in

their FP. It goes on to address an understandable explanation, which demonstrates that they endeavor to preserve their security. Concerning the revolutionary practices that are maintained and applied above on Iran's FP, with the ontological security, four issues must be pointed out:

Firstly, it may seem that the turnout of the practices of Iran above all concerned the US as a country that could harm Iran's security and national interests; by contrast, Iran's authorities' mindset is embraced by three experienced conceptions: first of one, the US caused to underplay in the region by the revolutionaries its enviable position, then it would be perforce reacted in progress. Second, the US's ultimate objective in Iran was to change the regime by any means of a coup to enjoy a good relationship with rapt attention, and it, therefore, remained as constantly counter-revolution as rapt expressed as the Great Satan by Ayatollah Khomeini. Lastly, as experienced, the US doesn't stand up for its proxies in the region while entangled in crises therein need to help out, such as the Shah in Iran after the revolution of 1979 and President Hosni al-Mubarak in Egypt in 2011. It is never a tried and trusted procedure in the US thereupon.

Secondly, by being identity-driven by Iran's revolutionary FP, it seeks to achieve recognition as it were and promised the grace society and continues to have the oppressed, such as the Palestinian self-destination to support strongly, the thing that has no chance to split the difference because it comes down to the US interest to have to do in favor of Israel's destination in the end. It is the ontological security of the revolutionary state to realize itself to the world; as Herbert Marcuse pointed out, "the state is the realization of reason" (1955: 5). The reason addressed here seems a far cry from the means-ends relation, that is strived for catching up its regional stratification by itself. It can be found somehow in different phrases "IRI is intended that no substitute for renewing the imperial powers in a while removing the current superpowers domination in the region; instead, fighting with the global imperialism is a moral and cultural obligation, that strives to enhance the rule of the human virtues as a matter of facts" (Mohammadi 1998: 35). The 7 October 2023 attack of Hamas on Israel is a good example of why it is approved and encouraged by Iran.

Third, there is a specific meaning of uncertainty embedded into ontological security for the revolutionaries, an Islamic-Quranic term for fear and hope (khof va raja in Arabic). It means its orthodox version is that one should be genuinely concerned about the behaviour and that according to the divine conviction by which one is willing to hope for God, one is not certain that it is reaching to being accepted because it is outside of its domain. It predicates an 'unresolvable uncertainty' (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 132) to convey meaning to in a predicament, the situation must be avoided from either a false optimism or spring a surprise; thereby, it is pending is going to happen in progress. Iranian revolutionary FP must catch on to the context in which its survival is embedded in the uncertainty context so that if all is going to be the safety mood, it should be strongly suspected and vice versa. In a sense, the uncertainty is, in turn, perceived as a state of certainty by the revolutionaries.

Lastly, the revolutionaries in Iran strived not to reach that point in which the situation came in the stark contradiction of their intentions; by extension, it would shame them or call for an account of what they did in the past without getting a certain result. If Iran is by force persuaded into a rapprochement with the US and Israel, it would answer an awkward question what is the difference between the Islamic Republic and the Pahlavi Dynasty? The aftermath of suffering the severe damage of the revolutionary breakout and the war casualties came along. To escape from the predicament, the revolutionaries may be using a last restoring an asymmetric pattern to refuse to call for the account, which is so-called Revolutionary Warfare in strategic terminology (Baylis 1975: 95). It is pointed out by an expert of Iran's FP as "any of reducing and downsizing the revolutionary position, orientation and attitude, it would be perceived as a threat of 'pass away of itself' or 'subvert by itself' and exposing the system to criticism of legitimacy, decent quality, and efficiency. Further ... it creates a chance for the 'export of crisis' abroad which converted public concerns about dysfunction into a foreign threat. Consequently, the crisis-driven discourse is not only quietly possible; but also seems as reasonable as the revolutionary agents faced with. Hence, with a 'big chance' as an 'aggressive strategy,' it could be seen as the 'defensive' one indeed" (Tajik 2003: 82).

CONCLUSION

The paper tried to prove a point that the foreign policy of Iran since 1979 can be described out of an ordinary way. What has been endeavored to do until now is inadequate to explain, analyze, and predict it. It strived to do it by extension of the revolution and foreign policy. Compared with the Islamic and the national (Persian) ideational orientations, it could be an explanatory description of the multi-dimensional characters of Iran's foreign policy, including its mindset, process, structure, and turnout. It is shown that when the revolutionaries face the rocked barriers of the realities, the two options are too true as usual: continuation or discontinuation. The latter option would cause a de-legitimized perception reaction to the revolutionary ideas. It pursued the former, so it should be down with the stark options such as the waging war, ebb and flow of process in the foreign policy, propagating the revolutionary Ideals to corroborate itself. As a result, it faced to survive issues or be saved from the existential threat. In this situation, the international system strived to socialize it with the realistic imperative by engaging in power and wealth sharing. At this stage, it would be temporarily removed from aggressive intentions such as the export of revolution. However, it does not mean withdrawing from the revolutionary motif, and it would be just a chance time to appeal. That is why the foreign policy of IRI cannot be examined by the linear analysis, so it needs to be a hybrid one such as the paper tried to explain by it, which means ontological security.

Consequently, revolutionary states such as Iran's since 1979 when did not achieve true revolutionary aims and also tried to resist fiercely to be a normal state like the others, faced with extra- pressure from abroad to decline its ideals in wartime or enforce the sanctions to obey in the time by which not threatened existentially. When both coalesced, it was fraught

with problems as made in Ahmadinejad's presidency till now. Under maximum pressure, the international system tries to test how far being tolerated or fragile as in the second term of President Trump has tested in 2025. That means the more pressure, the more resistance comes out as Raisi's administration did. It exacerbates a big problem for the international system as to how should be done to modify this disorderly behaviour; because it is unable to pursue its ideals, it failed to reach its aims by waging war, and it faced a huge cause to make a grace situation by the continuous sanctions; especially when the revolutionary aimed to restore its purposes by a stark option such as the nuclear program. The revolutionaries tried not to be under attack as the existential one, not to be more grace and well-being to neglect the Ideals. It reveals an essential problem from the inside, and outside there is no room for chance and a solution when trying to get away from a military attack or domestic collapse. After the collapsed of Ass'ad regime in Syria in 2024, let back to the future; the past has been written with ink and the future by pencil.

Acknowledgment

The author would appreciate Shahid Beheshti University's spiritual support for this research.

REFERENCES

- Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin (2017-2018) "Iran and World After Rouhani", *JETRO-IDEME Review*, Vol. 5.
- Ansari, Ali (2016) "Iran's Eleventh Presidential Elections Revisited; The Politics of Managing Change", *LSE Middle East Paper Series*, Vol. 17.
- Ardent, Hannah (1990) *On Revolution*, New York: Penguin Books.
- Axworthy, M. (2014) "Principles and debates in Iranian Foreign Policy", *Hemispheres, studies on Culture and Societies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 21-32.
- Azghandi, Alireza (2002) *Foreign policy of IRI*, Tehran: Ava Noor. [In Persian]
- Baylis, John (1975) "Revolutionary Warfare" in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds.) *Contemporary Strategy; Theories and Politics*, New York and London: Routledge.
- Booth, Ken and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008) *The Security Dilemma; Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics*, Macmillan: Palgrave.
- Brinton, Crane (1962) *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York: Vantage Book.
- Burke, Edmund (1790) *Reflections on the French Revolution*, London: M. Dent & Coons LTD.

Dehghani Firoozabadi, Seyyed Jalal (2009) "Ontological Security in IRI's Foreign policy", *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No.1, 41-76. [In Persian]

Dehghani Firouzabadi, Seyyed Jalal (2005) *A Discourse Turn in Foreign policy of IRI*, Tehran: Iran newspaper Publication. [In Persian]

Fatemi Nejad, Seyed Ahmad (2024) "Between Geography and International Relations; Explaining the Neighborhood", *Geopolitics Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 290-313.

Gharayagh-Zandi, Davoud (2006) *Civilized Institutions and Identity in Iran*, Tehran: Tamadon Irani. [In Persian]

Gharayagh-Zandi, Davoud (2005) *Iran and the Nuclear Program*, Tehran: Institute of Strategic Studies. [In Persian]

Gharayagh-Zandi, Davoud (2008) "Principles of IRI's Foreign policy; A Textual Survey", *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 277-312. [In Persian]

Gharayagh-Zandi, Davoud (2020) "A Social Understanding in Context of Foundation, Continuation, and Termination of ISIS: Knowing New Philosophy of Society (NPS)", in Darya Bazarkina, Evgeny Pashentsev and Greg Simons (eds.) *Terrorism and New Advanced Technologies in Psychological Warfare New Risks New Opportunities to Counter the Terrorist Threats*, New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Grove, Andrew K. (2007) *Political Leadership in Foreign policy; Manipulating Support across Borders*, Macmillan: Palgrave.

Hajjiyousofi, Amirmohammad (2005) *IRI Foreign Policy in the Light of Regional Development; 1991-2001*, Tehran: Iran's Foreign Ministry Publications. [In Persian]

Halliday, Fred (1986) "Iranian Foreign Policy since 1979: Internationalism and Nationalism in the Islamic Revolution", in Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie (eds.) *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, London: New Haven.

Halliday, Fred (1999) *The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power*, London: Macmillan.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1965) *Political Order in Changing Society*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jennings, Jeremy (2011) *Revolution and the Republic; A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteenth Century*, US; Oxford University Press.

Juneau, Thomas (2015) *Squandered Opportunity; Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy*, Stanford; Stanford University Press.

Khalili, Reza and et.al. (2023) "US Foreign policy and Regional Power and Influence of Iran; Comparison of Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations", *Geopolitics Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 194-219.

Khamenei, Ali (2018) *The Statement of the Second Step of the Revolution to the Iranians*, available at Khamenei.ir. [In Persian]

Mansouri Mgaddam, Jahanshir and Ali Esmaili (2011) "An analysis of the IRI's Foreign Policy at Ahmadinejad Administration according to the Linkage theory of James Rosenau", *Quarterly of Politics*, Vol. 41, No.1, pp. 283-300. [In Persian]

Marcuse, Herbert (1955) *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul LTD.

Marx, Karl (1972) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Milani, Mohsen (2002) "Iran's World Role", *Rahbord*, Vol. 31, No.1, 175-196. [In Persian]

Miller, Robert F. (1991) *Soviet Foreign Policy Today; Gorbachev and the New Political Thinking*, London: Unwin Hyman.

Mintz, Alex and Karl Derouen (2010) *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.

Mitzen, Jennifer (2006) "Ontological Security in World Politics; State Identity and Security Dilemma", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 341-370.

Mohammadi, Manouchehr (1998) *An Introduction to Foreign Policy of IRI*, Qom: Islamic Development Organization. [In Persian]

Mossalanejad, Abbas (2023) "Iran and the Resistance Policy Making towardss US Regional Cliebts's Actors", *Geopolitics Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1-21.

Naghizadeh, Ahmad (2009) "Theoretical and Practical Challenges in IRI Foreign policy", *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No.2, 33-55. [In Persian]

Neack, Laura, Jeanne K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney (1995) *Foreign Policy Analysis; Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*, New York: Princeton Hall.

Nowrozi, Nourmohammad (2004) "A Political Discourse Dynamic and Development in Iran's Foreign Policy Action", *Rahbord*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 197-224. [In Persian]

Perteghlla, Annalisa (2017) "Security Spoiler or Political Brokers? Iran's role in the Middle East", in Paolo Magri and Annalisa Perteghlla (eds.) *Post-Vote Iran Giving Engagement a Change*, ISPI, Ledizioni LeddiPublishing.

Pourakhondi Darzi, Nader (2002) *A Comparative Study on Iran's Foreign Policy in Hashmi and Khatami Administrations*, Unpublished MA Dissertation in IR at Allameh Tabatabai University. [In Persian]

Przeczek, Sermin (2013) "Iran's Foreign Policy under President Rouhani; Pledges versus Reality", *Ortadogu Anliz*, 5, 57.

Rankel, Eva Patricia (2007) "Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution; 1979-2006", *Perspective on Global Development and Technology*, 6, 159-187.

Ramazani, Rohollah (2001) *A Analytical Frame for Examining Foreign policy of IRI*, Translated into Farsi by Alireza Tayyeb, Tehran: Ney. [In Persian]

Reisinezhad, Arash (2023) "Iran's Strategic Loneliness and Non-State Foreign Policy: From Curse of Geography to Geopolitical Predicament", *Geopolitics Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 269-306. [In Persian]

Renshon, Jonathan and Stanley Renshon (2008) "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making", *Political Psychology*, Vol. 29, No. 4.

Roshandel, Jalil (2002) "Iran's Foreign and Security Policy", *Policy Paper*, Tehran: Institute of Strategic Studies. [In Persian]

Sadri, Houman (2002) "Iran's Foreign Policy Orientations: 1975-1997", Translated into Farsi by Hossein Alipour, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 443-462. [In Persian]

Samani Jelodar, Younes and et.al. (2020) "JCPOA and its Impact on Iran's Regional Policies and Strategies; Continuity and Change", *Geopolitics Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 172-202. [In Persian]

Sariolghalam, Mahmood (2009) "IRI's Foreign policy; Capability and Possibility of Continuity", *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No.1, 21-40. [In Persian]

Shaffer, Brenda (2006) "Introduction: The Limits of Culture", in Brenda Shaffer (ed.) *The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Sofer, Ken (2012) "China and the Collapse of its Noninterventionist Foreign Policy; Past Diplomatic Practices Collide with Rising Economic and Political Realities", *Center for American Progress*.

Steele, Brent (2008) *Ontological Security in International relations; Self-Identity and the IR State*, New York and London: Routledge.

Tajik, Mohammadreza (2003) *Foreign policy; A Non-Approached and Non-Decision Realm?* Tehran: Gofman. [In Persian]

Tayfur, M. Fatith (1994) "Main Approaches to the Study of Foreign policy; A Review", *METU Studies in Development*, Vol. 21, No.1; 131-141.

Valipour Zaroomi, Seyyed Hossein (2004) *Foreign policy Discourses of IRI*; Tehran: Institute of Strategic Studies. [In Persian]

Zaree, Bahador, Ali Zaynivand and Mansour Rezaali (2014) "Geography of Transnational Islam and Foreign policy of IRI", *Human Geography Research Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 119-135. [In Persian]

Zuckerman, M. (2008) "Personality and sensation seeking" in G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews, & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Personality Theory and Assessment, Vol. 1. Personality theories and models*, Sage Publications.