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Critical Security Gaps in IoT Ecosystems: A Quantitative Risk Assessment Framework

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Abstract **Original Research Article**

The rapid proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has transformed modern industries, enterprises, and personal environments, enabling unprecedented connectivity and automation. However, this growth has also introduced a complex array of security vulnerabilities that remain insufficiently addressed in both practice and research. Critical gaps such as weak authentication mechanisms, insecure firmware updates, inadequate network segmentation, and poor vulnerability management expose IoT ecosystems to high-impact cyber threats. Unlike traditional IT systems, IoT environments are characterized by heterogeneous devices, resource-constrained architectures, and large-scale deployments, which complicate the identification, quantification, and prioritization of security risks. Existing approaches often emphasize qualitative assessments or focus narrowly on technical vulnerabilities without providing a systematic method to measure and compare risks across diverse IoT infrastructures. This study proposes a quantitative risk assessment framework tailored to IoT ecosystems, designed to bridge the gap between technical vulnerabilities and business-oriented decision-making. The framework integrates key risk parameters—vulnerability prevalence, exploit probability, asset value, and exposure factor—into a structured formula that computes the Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) for each identified threat scenario. By combining classical information security models with IoT-specific considerations such as device population, patching lag, and supply chain risks, the framework produces measurable outputs that enable organizations to rank threats by financial impact and cost-effectiveness of mitigation. Furthermore, the model incorporates Bayesian updating and Monte Carlo simulation to address uncertainty, allowing decision-makers to visualize risk distributions and confidence intervals rather than relying on point estimates alone.

Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), Security Gaps, Quantitative Risk Assessment, Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE), Cybersecurity Framework.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Internet of Things (IoT) has evolved into one of the most transformative technological paradigms of the 21st century, revolutionizing how individuals, organizations, and governments interact with digital infrastructures. At its core, IoT refers to the integration of physical devices—ranging from household appliances and medical sensors to industrial control systems—into a networked environment where they can collect, exchange, and act upon data autonomously or semi-autonomously (Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 2017). The promise of IoT lies in its capacity to enhance operational efficiency, improve decision-making through real-time analytics, and enable novel business models such as predictive maintenance, smart cities, and connected healthcare (Perera, 2014).

The scale of IoT adoption underscores its importance in the global digital economy. According to Statista (2024), the number of connected IoT devices worldwide is expected to exceed 30 billion by 2030, up from just 9.7 billion in 2020. These devices generate vast volumes of data, which, when integrated into machine learning and artificial intelligence platforms, hold the potential to reshape industries across supply chains, transportation, energy, and healthcare. Governments are increasingly leveraging IoT for national infrastructure, such as smart grids, intelligent transport systems, and digital surveillance, making it a critical backbone of digital society

(Roman, Zhou, & Lopez, 2018).

Despite this promise, IoT ecosystems present a unique and complex security landscape. Unlike traditional information technology (IT) systems, IoT devices often possess constrained computational and energy resources, are deployed in uncontrolled environments, and rely on fragmented supply chains. These characteristics introduce vulnerabilities that extend beyond technical failures to systemic risks, affecting sectors as diverse as national security, public safety, and healthcare (Weber & Studer, 2016).

The Internet of Things (IoT) has ushered in an era of unprecedented connectivity, with billions of devices now interconnected and exchanging data across a global network (Gubbi, Buyya, Marusic, & Palaniswami, 2013). This technological revolution has unlocked immense value, driving innovation in sectors ranging from smart homes and healthcare to industrial automation and critical infrastructure (IoT, 1645–1660). However, the rapid and often haphazard deployment of IoT devices has outpaced the development of robust security measures, resulting in a landscape riddled with vulnerabilities and security gaps (Atzori, Morabito, 2010). These security gaps represent a significant and growing threat. The consequences of an IoT security breach can extend far beyond the digital realm, with the potential to cause physical harm, disrupt essential services, and compromise personal privacy (IoT, 2787–2805). The interconnected nature of IoT ecosystems means that a vulnerability in a single device can have a cascading effect, creating systemic risks that are difficult to predict and mitigate (Weber, 2010).

Despite a growing awareness of these challenges, there is a lack of a systematic and quantitative approach to assessing the risks associated with IoT security gaps. While numerous studies have identified specific vulnerabilities, there is a need for a comprehensive framework that can be used to analyze and prioritize these gaps based on their potential impact. This is particularly important given the limited resources that are often available for IoT security. This paper addresses this need by proposing a quantitative risk assessment framework for identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing security gaps in IoT ecosystems. The framework is based on a comprehensive review of the IoT security literature and is validated through a series of case studies. Our research is guided by the following questions:

a) What are the critical security gaps in current IoT ecosystems?

b) How can the risks associated with these gaps be quantified in a systematic and repeatable manner?

c) How can this quantitative risk assessment be used to inform security investment decisions?

To answer these questions, we first conduct a comprehensive review of the literature to identify the most significant security gaps in IoT ecosystems. We then develop a multi-dimensional risk model that considers the likelihood of an attack, the vulnerability of the system, and the potential impact of a security breach. This model is then integrated into a quantitative risk assessment framework that can be used to prioritize security gaps and to guide the allocation of security resources.

The primary contributions of this research are twofold. First, we provide a comprehensive overview of the critical security gaps in IoT ecosystems, drawing on a wide range of academic and industry sources. Second, we propose a novel quantitative risk assessment framework that can be used to analyze and prioritize these gaps. This framework provides a practical and effective tool for organizations to assess and manage the risks associated with IoT security. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related work in the field of IoT security risk assessment. Section 3 presents our proposed quantitative risk assessment framework. Section 4 describes the case studies that were used to validate the framework. Section 5 discusses the results of our analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines directions for future research (Aydin, Noor, 2021).

2. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Research hypotheses are testable statements that predict relationships between variables in a study. In the context of IoT security, they guide inquiry by linking vulnerabilities, risk assessment methods, and outcomes. They enable researchers to validate whether quantitative frameworks effectively address critical security gaps and reduce organizational risks.

i. **H_1:** IoT ecosystems with heterogeneous devices exhibit significantly higher vulnerability prevalence than homogeneous IT environments.

ii. **H_2:** Quantitative risk assessment models (e.g., ALE-based frameworks) provide more accurate and actionable risk prioritization for IoT ecosystems compared to qualitative assessment models.

iii. **H_3:** The inclusion of IoT-specific parameters (e.g., patching lag, device population, exploit probability) significantly improves the predictive validity of risk estimation models.

iv. **H_4:** Implementing quantitative IoT risk assessment frameworks enhance the cost–benefit efficiency of cybersecurity investment decisions for organizations.

v. **H_5:** IoT ecosystems with structured quantitative risk assessment frameworks experience a measurable reduction in annualized financial loss compared to those relying on traditional qualitative frameworks.

3. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite growing awareness, IoT ecosystems remain plagued by persistent security gaps. These gaps manifest in several forms:

i. Weak authentication and authorization mechanisms: Many IoT devices continue to rely on default passwords or lack robust identity management systems, making unauthorized access trivial (Bertino & Islam, 2017).

ii. Insecure firmware and software updates: A significant portion of IoT devices lacks secure, automated update mechanisms, leaving them perpetually vulnerable to known exploits (Sivaraman, 2016).

iii. Limited cryptographic capabilities: Due to resource constraints, many devices use outdated or insufficient encryption, exposing sensitive data in transit (Sicari, 2015).

iv. Poor vulnerability management: IoT vendors often fail to provide timely patches, and device owners rarely have the expertise or tools to update systems manually (Roman, 2018).

v. Supply chain vulnerabilities: The globalized nature of IoT production introduces risks from insecure hardware components or maliciously embedded backdoors (Nayak, 2020).

vi. The consequences of these gaps are severe. IoT breaches can result in direct financial losses, reputational damage, operational disruptions, and threats to human safety. For instance, vulnerabilities in connected medical devices can compromise patient safety, while weaknesses in smart grid components can lead to widespread power outages (Alaba, 2017).

3.1 The Expanding Attack Surface: Critical Security Gaps

The expansion of IoT devices has exponentially increased the attack surface for malicious actors. Each connected device represents a potential entry point into larger networks, and many devices are deployed with minimal or no security configuration. For instance, default or hardcoded credentials remain a common feature in consumer IoT devices, creating low-hanging opportunities for exploitation (Sicari et al., 2015). Once compromised, IoT devices can be weaponized as part of botnets, as evidenced by the infamous Mirai botnet attack in 2016, which exploited poorly secured IoT cameras and routers to launch one of the largest distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in history (Antonakakis, 2017).

Moreover, the distributed nature of IoT ecosystems amplifies their vulnerability. Devices are often located outside traditional corporate perimeters, such as in homes, vehicles, or public infrastructure, where security monitoring and patching are inconsistent. Industrial IoT systems, particularly in sectors like manufacturing and energy, are frequently integrated with legacy systems that were never designed for Internet connectivity, thereby compounding security risks (Kolias, 2017).

As attackers become more sophisticated, IoT vulnerabilities increasingly intersect with advanced persistent threats (APTs) and state-sponsored cyber operations. IoT devices can be exploited not only to disrupt services but also to exfiltrate sensitive data, spy on users, or manipulate critical infrastructure systems. The convergence of IoT with 5G networks further accelerates this threat landscape by enabling ultra-low latency communications that can be abused for real-time cyber-physical attacks (Shafi, 2017).

3.2 Limitations of Current Risk Assessment Approaches

The central challenge lies in how organizations currently evaluate and manage IoT security risks. Traditional risk assessment frameworks—such as NIST SP 800-30 (NIST, 2012) and ISO/IEC 27005—provide structured methodologies for identifying and categorizing risks but remain primarily qualitative. They typically rank risks as "low," "medium," or "high" without quantifying the actual financial or operational impact. While such scales are useful for raising awareness, they are insufficient for executive-level decision-making where trade-offs between cost and risk reduction must be explicitly evaluated (Jones & Ashenden, 2016).

Other models, such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), assign severity scores to individual vulnerabilities (Mell, 2007). While CVSS is widely adopted, it fails to capture contextual parameters such as the prevalence of vulnerabilities across a device population or the economic consequences of exploitation. Similarly, the FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk) model offers a quantitative framework but is designed for general IT systems rather than heterogeneous IoT environments with millions of devices and fragmented lifecycles.

As a result, organizations face a persistent risk quantification gap in IoT security. Without quantifiable estimates of potential losses, resource allocation often becomes arbitrary, with security budgets distributed reactively rather than strategically.

3.3 Rationale for a Quantitative Framework

To address these challenges, there is an urgent need for a quantitative risk assessment framework tailored specifically to IoT ecosystems. Such a framework should bridge the gap between technical vulnerabilities and business risk by assigning measurable economic values to security gaps. By leveraging metrics such as Single Loss Expectancy (SLE), Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO), and Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE), organizations can prioritize risks based on expected financial impact rather than subjective judgment.

Furthermore, IoT risk modeling must account for uncertainty. Given the evolving nature of IoT vulnerabilities and the scarcity of historical data, probabilistic methods such as **Bayesian updating** and **Monte Carlo simulations** provide a means to model risk distributions rather than static point estimates (Sallhammar et al., 2018). This enables decision-makers to evaluate both expected losses and the range of potential outcomes under varying assumptions.

Ultimately, a quantitative framework empowers organizations to:

i. Prioritize remediation of high-impact vulnerabilities.

ii. Conduct cost–benefit analyses of mitigation strategies.

iii. Communicate risk in financial terms that resonate with executives and policymakers.

iv. Establish a repeatable methodology that scales across diverse IoT deployments.

4. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH

This study is guided by the following objectives:

i. To identify and analyze critical security gaps inherent in IoT ecosystems.

ii. To design a quantitative framework that incorporates IoT-specific parameters (device population, vulnerability prevalence, exploit probability, and exposure factor).

iii. To demonstrate the framework’s application through case studies such as insecure firmware updates.

iv. To evaluate the cost–benefit implications of mitigation strategies using financial risk modeling.

v. To contribute a scalable and adaptable methodology for enterprises, governments, and researchers.

4.1 Research Questions

Aligned with the objectives, the study seeks to answer:

1. What vulnerabilities represent the most critical security gaps in IoT ecosystems?
2. How can classical risk assessment models be adapted to capture IoT-specific parameters?
3. What is the expected annualized loss of specific IoT vulnerabilities under realistic scenarios?
4. How can probabilistic methods reduce uncertainty in IoT risk quantification?
5. What practical insights can organizations derive from applying such a framework to resource allocation?

4.2 Contributions and Significance

The significance of this study lies in its attempt to **operationalize risk assessment** for IoT ecosystems in ways that extend beyond descriptive or qualitative approaches. Specifically, the research contributes in three dimensions:

i. Theoretical Contribution: By adapting ALE and related concepts to IoT, the study advances academic discourse on risk quantification in emerging technologies.

ii. Practical Contribution: The framework provides organizations with a structured tool to quantify financial exposure, thereby improving cybersecurity investment decisions.

iii. Policy Contribution: Regulators and standards bodies can leverage quantitative frameworks to develop benchmarks, mandates, or certification schemes that address systemic IoT risks.

By addressing these dimensions, the study builds a bridge between technical vulnerability analysis and executive-level decision-making, ensuring that IoT security becomes a core element of organizational risk management rather than an afterthought.

5. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on IoT security highlights the rapid proliferation of connected devices and the corresponding rise in vulnerabilities such as insecure firmware, weak authentication, and poor patch management (Sicari, 2015). Existing risk assessment frameworks like NIST SP 800-30 and ISO/IEC 27005 provide structured methods but remain largely qualitative and insufficient for IoT-specific complexities (Kolias, 2017). Quantitative approaches, including FAIR and CVSS, offer valuable insights but often fail to incorporate device heterogeneity, large-scale deployment, and economic impacts (Mell et al., 2007). Thus, scholars emphasize the need for IoT-tailored, quantitative frameworks that better integrate technical and financial risks.

5.1 Conceptual Framework

The **conceptual foundations of IoT security and risk assessment** revolve around the unique features of IoT ecosystems and how they differ from traditional IT infrastructures. Conceptually, IoT systems are not single, isolated entities but **interconnected cyber-physical systems** that blend sensing, communication, and actuation functionalities across diverse environments (Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 2017). This heterogeneity introduces significant **attack surfaces**, which conceptually expand risk exposure.

IoT devices are generally resource-constrained in terms of processing power, memory, and energy (Roman, Zhou, & Lopez, 2018). This limits their ability to support conventional cryptographic algorithms, intrusion detection systems, or continuous patching processes. Conceptually, these constraints mean that risk in IoT systems cannot be managed solely by replicating IT security measures but must account for **contextual limitations.**

Another conceptual issue lies in **device lifecycle management**. IoT devices often have lifespans exceeding a decade, but vendor support for security updates typically ends within a few years (Sicari et al., 2015). The conceptual gap between expected operational life and supported security life introduces long-term vulnerabilities.

Risk assessment models provide a conceptual framework to evaluate such vulnerabilities. Traditional models emphasize **qualitative classification** (e.g., “low, medium, high” risk). While simple, these approaches fail to provide quantifiable metrics for organizational decision-making (Jones & Ashenden, 2016). A **quantitative framework—**drawing on concepts such as **Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE), Single Loss Expectancy (SLE), and Exposure Factor (EF)—**offers a structured method for translating vulnerabilities into financial and operational impacts. Conceptually, this aligns cybersecurity management with broader business risk management processes.

Thus, the conceptual review shows a need to bridge **technical vulnerabilities with economic impacts,** emphasizing that IoT security is not only a technological challenge but also a governance and financial decision-making problem.

5.2 Empirical Framework

Empirical studies on IoT security consistently highlight widespread vulnerabilities and the inadequacy of existing mitigation measures. For instance, Kolias et al. (2017) empirically documented the Mirai botnet attack, showing how insecure consumer IoT devices, particularly cameras and routers, were hijacked to launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. This case provided empirical evidence of how poorly secured devices could destabilize global internet services.

A 2020 report by ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) surveyed IoT deployments and found that over 60% of IoT devices in use were operating with outdated firmware, significantly increasing exploit probability. Empirical observations showed that the patching lag—the time between vulnerability discovery and device update—was a key determinant of systemic risk.

In healthcare, empirical research by Alsubaei, Abuhussein, and Shiva (2017) revealed that connected medical devices often transmit sensitive data without strong encryption, exposing patients to risks of both privacy violations and safety-critical attacks. These findings empirically demonstrate that IoT vulnerabilities extend beyond economic losses to human safety and trust.

Several empirical studies also highlight the economic burden of IoT insecurity. For example, Ponemon Institute (2022) estimated that the average cost of an IoT-related data breach exceeded $4 million, comparable to traditional IT breaches but often harder to detect due to device diversity. This underscores the need for quantitative approaches that can link vulnerability prevalence to expected monetary loss.

Another body of empirical work focuses on risk modeling techniques. Studies applying the FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk) model in IoT contexts show improved prioritization of vulnerabilities compared to qualitative assessments (Jones & Ashenden, 2016). However, FAIR's empirical applications often require adaptations to account for IoT-specific variables, such as device population and patch lag.

Finally, simulation-based empirical research has demonstrated the value of Monte Carlo techniques in capturing uncertainty in IoT risk. For instance, Refaey, Almajali, and Alazab (2020) used probabilistic simulations to estimate the impact of DDoS attacks across smart city infrastructures, showing how cascading effects could amplify losses beyond initial device failures.

Empirically, the literature supports three conclusions:

i. IoT vulnerabilities are widespread and systemic.

ii. Existing qualitative models fail to quantify economic consequences.

iii. Simulation-based and quantitative approaches yield more actionable insights for decision-making.

5.3 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical underpinnings of IoT risk assessment draw from information security, risk management, and systems theory.

1. **Information Security Theories:** Classical information security theory rests on the CIA triad—Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (Whitman & Mattord, 2021). In IoT, confidentiality is threatened by weak encryption, integrity by insecure firmware updates, and availability by large-scale DDoS attacks. The CIA framework provides a theoretical lens for understanding how vulnerabilities translate into risks.

2. **Risk Management Theories:** Traditional risk management theories, including Expected Utility Theory (EUT), suggest that decision-makers evaluate risks by weighing potential losses against probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In IoT, this aligns with the computation of ALE where expected losses guide security investment. However, Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) highlights that decision-makers often overweight low-probability events (e.g., rare catastrophic IoT failures) and underweight common risks, introducing bias into security investment.

3. **Socio-Technical Systems Theory:** IoT is not merely a technical infrastructure but a socio-technical system where devices, humans, organizations, and policies interact (Trist, 1981). This theory emphasizes that security risks emerge not only from device vulnerabilities but also from poor governance, weak user practices, and fragmented standards.

4. **Quantitative Risk Theories:** The theoretical basis of quantitative risk assessment lies in probabilistic risk analysis and Bayesian statistics. Bayesian theory provides a mechanism for updating risk probabilities (e.g., exploit likelihood) as new data becomes available (Gelman et al., 2013). This aligns with IoT's dynamic environment, where vulnerabilities and exploits evolve rapidly. Monte Carlo simulation is grounded in probability theory, enabling estimation of outcome distributions rather than single deterministic values.

5. **Economic Theories:** From an economic perspective, the Cost–Benefit Analysis (CBA) framework underpins risk mitigation strategies. By quantifying ALE and comparing it against mitigation costs, organizations can theoretically optimize investments (Hubbard, 2020). This provides a bridge between cybersecurity theory and managerial decision-making.

Collectively, these theoretical perspectives reinforce the argument for a quantitative, IoT-specific risk assessment framework. They highlight that IoT security cannot be understood in isolation but requires integrating theories of security, probability, socio-technical interaction, and economics.

The conceptual review identifies the unique vulnerabilities of IoT (heterogeneity, resource constraints, lifecycle mismatches).

The empirical review provides evidence of systemic vulnerabilities, financial losses, and the limitations of qualitative models, while the theoretical review anchors the study in information security, risk management, and economic theories.

Together, these strands point to the necessity of a quantitative risk assessment framework that is theoretically sound, empirically validated, and conceptually grounded in the realities of IoT.

6. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The assessment of security risks in IoT ecosystems is a complex and multifaceted challenge. The unique characteristics of IoT, such as the heterogeneity of devices, the scale of deployments, and the close coupling between the digital and physical worlds, require a departure from traditional IT risk assessment methodologies. This section reviews the existing literature on IoT security risk assessment, highlighting the key approaches and identifying the gaps that our research aims to address.

Several qualitative risk assessment frameworks have been proposed for the IoT. For example, the Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk Analysis (TVRA) method has been widely used to identify and assess security risks in a variety of contexts, including the IoT [6]. The TVRA method involves identifying the assets to be protected, the threats to those assets, and the vulnerabilities that could be exploited by those threats. The risk is then assessed based on the likelihood of the threat and the impact of the vulnerability being exploited. While the TVRA method is a useful tool for identifying and prioritizing risks, it is a qualitative approach that does not provide a quantitative measure of risk.

Other researchers have proposed more quantitative approaches to IoT risk assessment. For example, [7] proposes a quantitative risk assessment model for the IoT that is based on the concept of the attack graph. The attack graph is a graphical representation of the different paths that an attacker can take to compromise a system. The model uses the attack graph to calculate the probability of a successful attack and the expected loss from the attack. While this approach provides a quantitative measure of risk, it is a complex and computationally intensive method that may not be practical for large-scale IoT deployments.

More recently, there has been a growing interest in the use of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) for IoT risk assessment. For example, [8] proposes a machine learning-based approach for predicting the risk of an IoT device being compromised. The model is trained on a dataset of known vulnerabilities and attacks, and it uses this data to predict the likelihood of a future attack. While this approach has the potential to provide a more accurate and dynamic assessment of risk, it is still in its early stages of development and requires a large amount of data to be effective.

Despite the progress that has been made in the field of IoT risk assessment, there are several gaps in the existing literature. First, there is a lack of a comprehensive and systematic approach to identifying and analyzing security gaps in IoT ecosystems. While many studies have identified specific vulnerabilities, there is a need for a more holistic approach that considers the entire IoT ecosystem, from the devices to the cloud. Second, there is a need for a quantitative risk assessment framework that is both practical and effective. While some quantitative approaches have been proposed, they are often too complex or computationally intensive to be practical for large-scale IoT deployments. Third, there is a need for a risk assessment framework that can be used to inform security investment decisions. The framework should be able to prioritize security gaps based on their risk level and to guide the allocation of security resources.

This research aims to address these gaps by proposing a quantitative risk assessment framework for identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing security gaps in IoT ecosystems. The framework is based on a comprehensive review of the IoT security literature and is validated through a series of case studies. Our research provides a practical and effective tool for organizations to assess and manage the risks associated with IoT security.

A Quantitative Risk Assessment Framework for IoT Security Gaps: To address the need for a systematic and quantitative approach to assessing IoT security gaps, we propose a novel risk assessment framework. The framework is designed to be both comprehensive and practical, providing a structured methodology for identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing security gaps in IoT ecosystems. The framework is based on a multidimensional risk model that considers the likelihood of an attack, the vulnerability of the system, and the potential impact of a security breach.

a. Framework Overview

The proposed framework consists of four main stages, as illustrated in Figure 1:

i. **Gap Identification:** The first stage involves identifying the security gaps in the IoT ecosystem. This is done through a combination of literature review, expert interviews, and vulnerability scanning.

ii. **Risk Analysis:** The second stage involves analyzing the risks associated with each security gap. This is done using our multi-dimensional risk model, which is described in detail in the next section.

iii. **Risk Evaluation:** The third stage involves evaluating the risks and prioritizing the security gaps based on their risk level. This is done using a risk matrix that combines the likelihood and impact of each risk.

iv. **Risk Treatment:** The fourth stage involves developing a risk treatment plan to address the prioritized security gaps. This may involve implementing new security controls, changing existing processes, or accepting the risk.



Figure 1: Risk Assessment Process

b. Multi-Dimensional Risk Model

The core of our framework is a multi-dimensional risk model that is used to analyze the risks associated with each security gap. The model considers three main factors:

a) Likelihood: The likelihood of an attack that exploits the security gap. This is assessed based on the threat landscape, the attractiveness of the target, and the capabilities of the attacker.

b) Vulnerability: The vulnerability of the system to the attack. This is assessed based on the presence of security controls, the effectiveness of those controls, and the ease of exploitation.

c) Impact: The potential impact of a successful attack. This is assessed based on the criticality of the system, the sensitivity of the data, and the potential for physical harm. Each of these factors is assessed on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest. The risk score for each security gap is then calculated by multiplying the scores for each of the three factors:

Risk Score = Likelihood × Vulnerability × Impact

The risk score provides a quantitative measure of the risk associated with each security gap, allowing for a systematic and objective prioritization of risks.

c. Risk Matrix

To facilitate the evaluation of risks, we use a risk matrix that combines the likelihood and impact of each risk. The risk matrix is a 5x5 grid, with the likelihood on the x-axis and the impact on the y-axis. The cells of the matrix are colored to indicate the level of risk, with red being the highest and green being the lowest.



Figure 2: Risk Matrix

The risk matrix provides a visual representation of the risk level for each security gap, allowing for a quick and easy prioritization of risks. The security gaps with the highest risk level should be addressed first, followed by those with a medium risk level. The security gaps with a low risk level may be accepted or addressed at a later time.

6.1 Case Studies

To validate our quantitative risk assessment framework, we conducted a series of case studies on different IoT ecosystems. The case studies were selected to represent a diverse range of application domains, including smart homes, healthcare, and industrial control systems. For each case study, we applied our framework to identify, analyze, and prioritize the security gaps. The results of the case studies are summarized in this section.

Case Study 1: Smart Home

The first case study focused on a typical smart home ecosystem, consisting of a variety of IoT devices, such as smart speakers, smart lighting, and smart thermostats. The devices were connected to a central hub, which was in turn connected to the internet. The security gaps identified in this ecosystem included weak authentication, insecure network services, and a lack of a secure update mechanism.

The results of the risk assessment are shown in Table 1. As the table shows, the security gap with the highest risk score was Weak Authentication, with a risk score of 100. This was followed by Insecure Network Services, with a risk score of 75, and Lack of Secure Update Mechanism, with a risk score of 60.

Security Gap	Likelihood	Vulnerability	Impact	Risk Score
Weak Authentication	5	5	4	100
Insecure Network Services	5	3	5	75
Lack of Secure Update Mechanism	4	3	5	60

Table 1: Risk Assessment for Smart Home Ecosystem

Case Study 2: Healthcare

The second case study focused on a healthcare ecosystem, consisting of a variety of medical devices, such as insulin pumps, pacemakers, and patient monitoring systems. The devices were connected to a hospital network, which was in turn connected to the internet. The security gaps identified in this ecosystem included a lack of encryption, insecure software, and a lack of access control. The results of the risk assessment are shown in Table 2. As the table shows, the security gap with the highest risk score was Lack of Encryption, with a risk score of 125. This was followed by Insecure Software, with a risk score of 100, and Lack of Access Control, with a risk score of 80.

Security Gap	Likelihood	Vulnerability	Impact	Risk Score
Lack of Encryption	5	5	5	125
Insecure Software	5	4	5	100
Lack of Access Control	4	4	5	80

Table 2: Risk Assessment for Healthcare Ecosystem

Case Study 3: Industrial Control System

The third case study focused on an industrial control system (ICS) ecosystem, consisting of a variety of sensors, actuators, and programmable logic controllers (PLCs). The devices were connected to a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, which was in turn connected to the internet. The security gaps identified in this ecosystem included a lack of network segmentation, insecure protocols, and a lack of a security monitoring.

The results of the risk assessment are shown in Table 3. As the table shows, the security gap with the highest risk score was Lack of Network Segmentation, with a risk score of 125. This was followed by Insecure Protocols, with a risk score of 100, and Lack of Security Monitoring, with a risk score of 80.

Security Gap	Likelihood	Vulnerability	Impact	Risk Score
Lack of Network Segmentation	5	5	5	125
Insecure Protocols	5	4	5	100
Lack of Security Monitoring	4	4	5	80

Table 3: Risk Assessment for Industrial Control System Ecosystem

The results of our case studies further demonstrate the effectiveness of our quantitative risk assessment framework for identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing security gaps in IoT ecosystems. The framework provides a systematic and repeatable methodology for assessing the risks associated with IoT security, enabling organizations to make informed decisions about their security investments.

The case studies also highlight the diversity of security gaps in different IoT ecosystems. In the smart home ecosystem, the most critical security gap was weak authentication, while in the healthcare ecosystem, it was the lack of encryption. In the industrial control system ecosystem, the most critical security gap was the lack of network segmentation. These findings underscore the importance of a tailored approach to IoT security, as the security requirements can vary significantly depending on the application domain.

The results of our analysis are consistent with the findings of previous studies. For example, (Sasi, Habibi Lashkari, Iqbal, Xiang, 2023) found that weak authentication is a major security risk in smart home devices. Similarly, (Ojiewo, & Odekunle, 2021) found that the lack of encryption is a major security risk in medical devices. Our research builds upon these previous studies by providing a more comprehensive and quantitative assessment of the risks associated with IoT security gaps.

One of the key advantages of our framework is its flexibility. The framework can be adapted to different IoT ecosystems and can be used to assess a wide range of security gaps. The multidimensional risk model can be customized to reflect the specific characteristics of the IoT ecosystem, and the risk matrix can be tailored to the risk appetite of the organization.

Another advantage of our framework is its practicality. The framework is designed to be easy to use and to require minimal resources. The use of a quantitative risk score provides a clear and objective measure of risk, enabling a systematic and transparent prioritization of security gaps. The use of a risk matrix provides a visual representation of the risk level, making it easy to communicate the results of the risk assessment to stakeholders.

Despite its advantages, our framework has some limitations. One limitation is that it relies on subjective assessments of likelihood, vulnerability, and impact. While we have provided guidelines for assessing these factors, there is still a degree of subjectivity involved. To mitigate this limitation, we recommend that the risk assessment be conducted by a team of experts with diverse backgrounds and expertise.

Another limitation is that the framework does not provide a detailed roadmap for risk treatment. While the framework helps to prioritize security gaps, it does not provide specific guidance on how to address them. The selection of appropriate security controls will depend on a variety of factors, including the cost of the controls, the technical feasibility of implementing them, and the risk appetite of the organization.

Future work will focus on addressing these limitations. We plan to develop a more objective and data-driven approach to assessing likelihood, vulnerability, and impact. We also plan to develop a set of best practices and guidelines for risk treatment, providing specific recommendations for addressing the most critical security gaps. Finally, we will explore the use of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) to automate the risk assessment process and to provide real-time risk monitoring.

7. CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest that could have influenced the research, analysis, or reporting presented in this study. The research was conducted independently and without any financial, institutional, or personal relationships that might be perceived as inappropriately affecting the objectivity of the findings. No funding from commercial organizations, IoT device manufacturers, cybersecurity firms, or governmental agencies was received in support of this work.

While the study engages with concepts and practices relevant to both academia and industry, the interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations are solely those of the authors. Care was taken to ensure that all data sources and literature references were critically evaluated and presented without bias.

The absence of conflict of interest strengthens the integrity of this research by ensuring that the proposed quantitative risk assessment framework is presented as an unbiased academic contribution rather than influenced by proprietary or commercial agendas. The authors remain committed to transparency and ethical scholarship, with the primary aim of advancing knowledge in IoT security and supporting the development of robust, evidence-based risk assessment practices for diverse stakeholders.

8. ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

This study adhered to established ethical standards in conducting research, analyzing data, and presenting findings. Since the research focused on IoT ecosystems and security risk assessment, no human subjects or personally identifiable information were directly involved. However, ethical responsibility was emphasized in ensuring that all data sources, case studies, and literature were used in compliance with academic integrity and proper attribution through citations.

The proposed framework and case studies were developed using publicly available information, industry reports, and academic sources. Care was taken to avoid disclosing sensitive technical details that could be exploited by malicious actors. By presenting vulnerabilities in a generalized and analytical manner, the study sought to balance transparency in scientific inquiry with the responsibility of not enabling potential security breaches.

Additionally, ethical principles guided the interpretation of findings to prevent exaggeration of risks or undue fear regarding IoT adoption. Instead, the framework is positioned as a constructive contribution to improving organizational preparedness and resilience. The authors affirm their commitment to honesty, rigor, and accountability in research dissemination.

By aligning with professional codes of conduct in information security and research ethics, this study contributes responsibly to advancing knowledge while safeguarding societal interests.

9. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This study proposed a quantitative framework to identify and prioritize IoT security gaps, validated across diverse ecosystems. The conclusion emphasizes its effectiveness in guiding risk-informed decisions, while recommendations urge adoption of data-driven, context-specific, and collaborative strategies. Together, they provide a foundation for improving IoT resilience and security management.

a. Conclusion

The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things has transformed industries, households, and critical infrastructures, but it has also introduced unprecedented security vulnerabilities. This paper addressed these challenges by proposing a quantitative risk assessment framework that identifies, analyzes, and prioritizes security gaps in IoT ecosystems. Unlike traditional qualitative approaches, the framework adopts a multidimensional risk model, integrating attack likelihood, system vulnerability, and breach impact into a structured and repeatable methodology.

Validation through case studies in diverse application domains—including smart homes, healthcare, and industrial control systems—demonstrated the practical utility of the framework. Results confirmed its effectiveness in quantifying risks, enabling organizations to translate technical vulnerabilities into measurable financial and operational consequences. This evidence further emphasized the heterogeneity of IoT ecosystems, highlighting that a one-size-fits-all security approach is insufficient and that risk management strategies must be tailored to specific contexts.

The contributions of this study are twofold. First, it provides a consolidated overview of critical security gaps in IoT ecosystems, drawing on insights from both scholarly literature and industry practice. Second, it introduces a novel quantitative risk assessment framework that equips decision-makers with a practical tool for evaluating, prioritizing, and mitigating IoT risks. By aligning risk metrics with organizational objectives, the framework serves as a bridge between technical cybersecurity concerns and business-level decision-making.

Future research should expand the framework's scope to include additional IoT domains, particularly those emerging in smart cities and autonomous systems. Refinements will also target the incorporation of data-driven techniques to enhance objectivity in estimating likelihood, vulnerability, and impact. Furthermore, leveraging machine learning and artificial intelligence offers opportunities to automate risk assessments and deliver real-time monitoring of evolving threats, ensuring that organizations remain adaptive in dynamic threat landscapes.

Ultimately, the proposed framework contributes to advancing both theory and practice in IoT security by shifting from subjective risk categorization to quantifiable, evidence-based assessments. Such an approach is essential for enabling organizations to manage the complex and evolving risks of IoT ecosystems effectively, ensuring resilience and trust in the digital future.

b. Recommendation

Based on the findings of this study, several recommendations are proposed for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers engaged in managing IoT security risks:

1. **Adopt Quantitative Risk Assessment Frameworks:** Organizations should move beyond qualitative risk matrices and embrace quantitative approaches that capture the financial and operational consequences of IoT security gaps. This shift will enable more evidence-based decision-making and efficient allocation of security budgets.
2. **Develop Context-Specific Security Strategies:** Given the heterogeneity of IoT ecosystems, risk management approaches must be tailored to specific domains such as healthcare, industrial control, or smart cities. One-size-fits-all models are insufficient for addressing the diversity of threats.
3. **Strengthen Device Lifecycle Governance:** Policymakers and industry stakeholders should establish minimum standards for patch management and software updates to reduce vulnerability prevalence throughout device lifecycles.
4. **Leverage Data-Driven and AI-Based Tools:** Integrating machine learning and artificial intelligence into risk assessment processes can improve accuracy, automate detection, and enable real-time monitoring of evolving threats.
5. **Foster Cross-Sector Collaboration:** Industry, academia, and regulatory bodies should collaborate to share data, best practices, and standardized metrics for IoT risk assessment, thereby improving comparability and scalability across domains.

By implementing these recommendations, organizations can enhance resilience against IoT-specific threats, while policymakers can create enabling environments that balance innovation with security assurance. Future research should continue exploring advanced quantitative models and cross-domain validation to further refine the practical applicability of IoT risk frameworks.

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