Free Movement, Border Regimes and Political Economy of Intra-West African Mobility

Despite decades of regional integration efforts and the formal adoption of free-movement protocols, travelling within West African states remains costly, slow, and unpredictable. This paper examines the political economy of intra-regional travel in West Africa, focusing on why mobility costs remain persistently high despite legal commitments to free movement under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It raises a pertinent question on why do the costs of intra-regional mobility in West Africa remain high despite formal free-movement commitments, and through what institutional and political mechanisms are these costs produced and sustained? Drawing on Institutional Political Economy and rent-seeking theory, the study argues that high travel costs are not merely technical or infrastructural failures but are embedded in incentive structures shaped by weak institutions, bureaucratic discretion, fragmented border governance, fiscal pressures, and security concerns. Using a qualitative-quantitative desk research design, the paper synthesizes data from World Bank corridor studies, African Development Bank and ECOWAS reports, aviation cost datasets, and peer-reviewed literature. The findings show that road travel costs are inflated by checkpoint proliferation, informal payments, and border delays; air travel is burdened by exceptionally high passenger taxes and charges; and security-related measures often function as mechanisms of rent extraction. The paper concludes that without incentive-compatible institutional reforms, particularly in border governance, corridor management, and aviation taxation, West Africa’s mobility regime will continue to undermine regional integration, trade, and inclusive development.