Tax Compliance Behaviour in Emerging Economies: Nigeria and Brazil

Tax compliance is a central challenge for emerging economies, where weak institutions, large informal sectors, and low tax morale often undermine domestic revenue mobilization and sustainable development. This review synthesizes theoretical and empirical evidence on tax compliance behaviour in Nigeria and Brazil, two major emerging economies representing Africa and Latin America, respectively. It draws on economic deterrence models, fiscal exchange theory, and behavioural approaches such as tax morale and the slippery slope framework, which emphasize the roles of trust in authorities and the power of tax administrations. The review adopts a narrative approach based on peer-reviewed articles, policy reports, and comparative statistics published mainly between 2000 and 2025. It examines the structure of tax systems in both countries, key economic, institutional, behavioural, and technological determinants of compliance, and the specific manifestations of these determinants in Nigeria and Brazil. The analysis highlights how Brazil’s more advanced digital infrastructure and relatively stronger enforcement coexist with persistent complexity and compliance costs, while Nigeria faces chronic structural weaknesses, informality, and governance challenges despite recent digitalization efforts. The paper concludes with policy implications and directions for future research, emphasizing the need to complement deterrence with trust-building, tax education, and simplification of tax systems to improve compliance in emerging economies.